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Stephan Meier 
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Abstract: 
Replication of empirical studies is much more than a tool to police the field. Failed 
replications force us to recognize that seemingly arbitrary design features may impact 
results in important ways. We describe a study that used a cognitive load manipulation to 
investigate the role of the deliberative system in charitable giving and a set of failed 
replications of that study. While the original study showed large and statistically 
significant results, we failed to replicate using the same protocol and the same subject 
pool. After the first failed replication, we hypothesized that the order our study was taken 
in a set of unrelated studies in a laboratory session generated the differences in effects. 
Three more replication attempts supported this hypothesis. The study demonstrates the 
importance of replication in advancing our understanding of the mechanisms driving a 
particular result and it questions the robustness of results established by cognitive load 
tests.  
 
 
Introduction 
Replication of empirical studies can help identify false positive results and uncover 
questionable research practices (see special section on replicability in Perspectives in 
Psychological Science, including Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). But running 
replications is about more than policing the field. Replications can elucidate how subtle 
differences in setting, subject pool, and protocol impact results. Specifically, failed 
replications force us to recognize that some seemingly arbitrary design features may be 
necessary for a result to arise, which can help us understand the mechanisms driving the 
effect (for a similar argument about laboratory and field experiments see Kessler, 2013). 
 
This paper describes a set of studies in which we use a cognitive load manipulation to 
investigate the role of the deliberative system in charitable giving (for a discussion of 
mental processes on charitable giving, see Loewenstein and Small (2007)). Our original 
results suggested that people gave substantially more money to a charity when placed 
under high cognitive load, results that were consistent with other findings in the 
literature. Schulz et al. (in press) and Rand et al. (2012) have found similar effects; 
however, Hauge et al. (2009) found no impact of load on giving.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* We thank Theresa Kelly for excellent work. We thank The Wharton School for research support and the 
Wharton Behavioral Lab for administering the studies. 
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Given our large treatment effect and statistically significant results, we were confident 
that our findings had pushed forward the frontiers of knowledge (see manuscript in 
SOM). While we were conducting more research, however, we failed to replicate our 
original result. We hypothesized that a subtle difference between the original study and 
the failed replication attempt — the order our study was taken in an hour-long laboratory 
session — generated the difference in effects. Three more replication attempts supported 
this hypothesis. 
 
Method 
The original study was a 2 (charity request or general request) x 2 (low or high cognitive 
load) between-subjects design. The replication attempts kept the same design, but here 
we focus only on the charity requests (see SOM for results from all sessions). Each study 
was one of several unrelated studies in an hour-long session at the Wharton Behavioral 
Lab. Sometimes our study was first in the session and sometimes it followed other 
studies. We were initially indifferent about the session order. Subsequently, we explicitly 
asked to be at the start of the session or fourth in the session as explained below. 
 
Subjects 
We analyze 405 University of Pennsylvania undergraduates (53.3% female) who 
participated in our charity request condition. Subjects received $10 payment for the hour-
long session and whatever amount they chose to keep in our study. Across all studies, the 
subject pool and the instructions were kept the same. 
 
Charity Request  
Subjects were placed under high or low cognitive load, given an endowment of $3, and 
asked how much of their endowment they wanted to donate to the American Red Cross.  
 
Cognitive load manipulation 
Cognitive load manipulations often involve memorizing a sequence (e.g., Gilbert et al., 
1995; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Since subjects made numeric 
giving decisions, we used a sequence of letters to avoid anchoring effects (Tversky, 
1974). Subjects were randomly assigned to memorize a 3-letter sequence (“GXN”) (low 
cognitive load), or a 9-letter sequence (“GXNTDPLRW”) (high cognitive load). We did 
not incentivize the load manipulation to avoid income effects. 
 
Results 
Figure 1 shows donations by cognitive load condition in the original study and in four 
replication attempts. In the original study subjects under high load give twice as much 
($0.51 vs. $1.12; 102 obs; t-test, t=2.99 p=0.004) and are 50% more likely to give (38% 
vs. 58%; 102 obs; pr-test, z=1.97 p=0.048). In Replications 1, 2 and 4 the sign of the 
effect is reversed and the effect on average donation is statistically significantly different 
from the effect in the original study (p<0.05 for all tests). We only replicate in attempt 3: 
under high load probability of donation increases (60% vs. 79%; 101 obs; pr-test z=2.00, 
p=0.046) and average donation directionally increases ($1.03 vs. $1.35, t-test, t=1.39 
p=0.168). 
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Fig. 1. Original Study and Four Replication Attempts. Panel A shows average amount of 
the $3 endowment donated to the American Red Cross (means ± SEM). Panel B shows 
percent of subject who donated a positive amount to the American Red Cross (± SEM). 
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Order in Session 
After our first failed replication attempt, we hypothesized that the difference in results 
was due to the order in the hour-long session our study was conducted. The original study 
was run fourth and Replication 1 was run first. Starting with Replication 2, we 
specifically asked to be run either first (Replication 2 and Replication 4) or fourth 
(Replication 3).  
 
Our data confirms our hypothesis that session order matters. When our study is first in the 
session, cognitive load directionally reduces charitable giving ($0.97 vs. $0.78); when it 
is later in the session, cognitive load increases charitable giving ($0.78 vs. $1.23; 203 
obs; t-test, t=2.84 p=0.005). The effect of load on giving statistically significantly 
interacts with session order (405 obs; OLS on average donation p=0.004; OLS on 
probability of donation p=0.020). The effect gets stronger when we control for the 
calendar date on which a session was run, allowing subjects who participate on different 
dates to have different baseline levels of generosity (405 obs; OLS on average donation 
p=0.001; OLS on probability of donation p=0.006). 
 
This pattern of results holds when looking only at the three replications conducted after 
forming our session-order hypothesis (233 obs; without date controls: OLS on average 
donation p=0.053; OLS on probability of donation p=0.024; with date controls: OLS on 
average donation p=0.030; OLS on probability of donation p=0.008). 
 
Discussion 
What can we learn by comparing an original study to its failed replications? When 
another researcher fails to replicate a study, the lack of a result might arise from 
differences in methods, subject pool, environment, or some other factor. When a 
researcher fails to replicate a result using the same instructions, subject pool, and 
laboratory environment, one must look for subtle differences between the replication 
attempt and the original study. 
 
Whether our study is first or later in a session affects the sign of the effect of cognitive 
load on charitable giving. One possible explanation is that the efficacy of our cognitive 
load manipulation is sensitive to session order. For example, the cognitive load task 
might more completely occupy the deliberative system if subjects have suffered mental 
fatigue from participating in studies earlier in the session. Similarly, subjects might be 
differently inclined to spend mental energy remembering the long string of letters in the 
high load treatment depending on mental fatigue. Our manipulation check questions 
provide some evidence that cognitive load is differently effective early and late in a 
session (see SOM4). Another possible explanation is that load is equally effective early 
and late in a session but that its effect on giving may be heavily moderated by the context 
of the request — even context as subtle as when in a session of studies the subject is 
asked to donate.  
 
Both of these possible explanations are worthy of future study. The former explanation 
tells a very cautious tale about cognitive load manipulations and suggests further 
replication attempts of results established using cognitive load manipulations. Both 
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explanations suggest that role of the deliberative system in charitable giving is far from 
resolved and that one should be cautious in relying on cognitive load manipulations to 
establish that result. A similar debate has arisen about the effectiveness of time-pressure 
tests on the role of the deliberative system in charitable giving (Rand et al., 2012; 
Tinghog et al., 2013).  
 
A natural next step for future research would be to randomize when in a session a load 
manipulation is run (rather than relying on between-session data) to investigate whether 
the treatment effect changes monotonically with session order and to investigate whether 
the types of other tasks subjects complete in a session moderate the effect of load on 
giving.  
 
Overall, these results demonstrate an important value of replication. Even when a 
replication fails, it may be able to teach something about the original effect.  
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Supplemental Online Material 
for 
 
 
Learning from (Failed) Replications: Cognitive Load Manipulations and Charitable 
Giving  
 
In this online appendix, we first present protocols and results from all of our studies 
(SOM1).  
 
We then present regression results supporting the claims in the paper focusing on the 
charity request to give to the Red Cross, both for all the data and focusing on the period 
after we developed our session order hypothesis (SOM2). 
 
In the SOM we also present the following additional results:  
 
Results from the general request, a request to give money back to the experimenter in 
some studies or to the Wharton Fund in other studies, and results from the opt-in studies 
(SOM3). 
 
Regression results from Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005) questions that 
were an attempted manipulation check (SOM4). 
 
Finally we present the instructions for the study (SOM5) and the text of our original 
paper (SOM6). 
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SOM1. Protocols of all Studies  
 
In all studies participants were… 
• Given a string of either 3 (low load) or 9 (high load) letters to memorize.   
• Put through the steps listed in the Protocol column 
• Asked to recall the letter sequence. 
• Asked to indicate which CRT questions they had seen before. 
 
 
Study  Run 
Date 
Session 
Order 
# of 
Ss 
Design Protocol 
Original 4/10/12-
4/16/12 
4th 205 
 
2 (load: high vs. low) x 2 (request 
type: experimenter vs. Red Cross) 
x 2 (request order: charity first vs. 
second) with request order as a 
within-subject factor. Analysis 
ignores the second decision, 
treating the experiment as a 2 
(load) x 2 (request type) between-
subjects design. 
• Asked the first CRT question (bat & ball).   
• Endowed with $3 and asked how much they wanted to give to 
the Red Cross [experimenter].   
• Asked the second CRT question (widget).   
• Endowed with an additional $3 and asked if they wanted to 
give to the other request. 
• Asked the third CRT question (lake).   
Opt 1 7/12/12- 
7/18/12 
3rd 192 2 (load: high vs. low) x 2 (request 
type: experimenter vs. Red Cross) 
with request as opt in to donate 
and donation request made once 
load was removed 
• Asked the first CRT question (bat & ball).   
• Endowed with $3, given a chance to opt-in to see a request to 
give to the Red Cross [experimenter] at the end of the study. 
• Asked the remaining two CRT questions.  
Opt 2 9/4/12-
9/5/12 
1st 86 Identical to Opt 1 Identical to Opt 1 
Rep 1 9/6/12- 
9/7/12 
1st 139 2 (load: low vs. high) x 2 (request 
type: Wharton Fund vs. Red 
Cross) between subjects design. 
• Asked the first CRT question (bat & ball).   
• Endowed with $3 and asked how much they wanted to give to 
the Red Cross [Wharton Fund].   
• Asked the remaining two original CRT questions plus three 
additional new CRT questions.   
Rep 2 10/25/12- 1st 194 2 (load: low vs. high) x 3 (request • Asked the first CRT question (bat & ball).   
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10/31/12, 
11/5/12-
11/9/12 
type: charity forced vs. charity 
opt-in vs. experimenter) between 
subjects design 
• Endowed with $3 and asked how much they wanted to give to 
the Red Cross [experimenter] OR (opt-in) given a chance to 
opt-in to see a request to give to the Red Cross.   
• Asked the remaining two original CRT questions plus three 
additional new CRT questions.   
Rep 3 11/15/12-
11/21/12 
4th 202 Identical to Rep 1  Identical to Rep 1 
Rep 4 1/22/13-
1/28/13 
1st 206 2 (load: low vs. high) x 3 (request 
type: Experimenter vs. Wharton 
Fund vs. Red Cross) between 
subjects design. 
• Asked the first CRT question (bat & ball).   
• Endowed with $3 and asked how much they wanted to give to 
the Red Cross [Wharton Fund; experimenter].   
• Asked the remaining two original CRT questions plus three 
additional new CRT questions.   
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SOM2. Regression Results of Donation to Red Cross 
 
 Donation Decisions to Red Cross by Load and Late in Session 
 Average Donation Probability of Donation 
 All Red Cross Data Post-Hypothesis Data All Red Cross Data Post-Hypothesis Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
High Load* 
Late in Session 
0.633 
(0.219)*** 
0.709 
(0.217)*** 
0.589   
(0.303)* 
0.677   
(0.309)** 
0.229 
(0.098)** 
0.273 
(0.099)*** 
0.284 
(0.125)** 
0.342  
(0.128)*** 
High Load -0.193 
(0.153) 
-0.198 
(0.155) 
-0.270 
(0.199) 
-0.300   
(0.206) 
-0.051   
(0.071) 
-0.067   
(0.073) 
-0.097 
(0.087) 
-0.132  
(0.091) 
Late in Session -0.188 
(0.153)  
-0.083 
(0.213)  
-0.046   
(0.070)  
0.007 
(0.090)  
Constant 0.974   
(0.118)***  
1.113  
(0.151)***  
0.546  
(0.051)***  
0.597   
(0.063)***  
Date Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 405 405 233 233 405 405 233 233 
This table reports OLS regression results on the average amount donated and a linear probability model (OLS) of whether the subject 
donated a positive amount. Date Dummies include a dummy variable for each calendar date on which the study was run to allow for 
different average levels of donation on each date. Post-Hypothesis Data looks only at the Red Cross Charity request for Replications 2, 
3, and 4 after we developed our session order hypothesis. Robust standard errors are used for all tests and significance is donated: * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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SOM3. Results of all Studies  
 
Red Cross Experimenter Wharton Fund 
Low Load High Load! Low Load High Load! Low Load High Load!
Study 
Session 
Order 
# of  
Ss Avg $ % Don Avg $ % Don Avg $ % Don Avg $ % Don Avg $ % Don Avg $ % Don 
Original 
(1st ask) 4th 205 $0.51 38.4% $1.12** 58.0%* $0.29 25.5% $0.21 19.2%     
Rep 1 1st 139 $0.73 45.7% $0.66 48.6%     $0.24 20.0% $0.22 23.5% 
Rep 2 
(no opt) 1st 125 $1.02 59.3% $0.79 44.4% $0.52 33.3% $0.29 25.0%     
Rep 3 4th 202 $1.03 60.3% $1.35 79.1%*     $0.38 37.2% $0.15* 15.5%* 
Rep 4 1st 206 $1.19 60.0% $0.90 55.9% $0.37 28.9% $0.30 25.8% $0.22 17.2% $0.25 30.8% 
   Red Cross Experimenter  
   Low Load High Load! Low Load High Load!   
   % Opt In % Opt In % Opt In % Opt In   
Opt 1 3rd 192 50.0% 52.0% 34.0% 54.3%*   
Opt 2 1st 86 45.5% 59.1% 40.9% 25.0%   
Rep 2 
(opt) 1st 67 40.0% 50.0%     
This table reports results from each study and indicates whether the high load and low load conditions are statistically significantly 
different using t-tests (for average donation) and pr-tests (for probability of donation and probability of opting in): * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01. 
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SOM4. Cognitive Reflection Tests 
 
 Cognitive Reflection Test Questions Answered Correctly by High Load and Late in Session 
 Subjects Analyzed in this Paper All Subjects 
 Bat  
(0 or 1) 
Bat and Widget  
(0 to 2) 
Bat, Widget and Lake 
(0 to 3) 
Bat  
(0 or 1) 
Bat and Widget  
(0 to 2) 
Bat, Widget and 
Lake (0 to 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
High Load* 
Late in Session 
-0.193 
(0.099)* 
-0.184     
(0.102) 
-0.409   
(0.165)** 
-0.425   
(0.169)** 
-0.481   
(0.226)** 
-0.505   
(0.229)** 
-0.056 
(0.057) 
-0.056  
(0.057) 
-0.001 
(0.065) 
-0.097  
(0.093) 
-0.131 
(0.126) 
-0.127    
(0.126) 
High Load 0.116 
(0.070)* 
0.109  
(0.072) 
0.202   
(0.118)* 
0.208   
(0.122)* 
0.279   
(0.161)* 
0.295    
(0.166)* 
0.037   
(0.040) 
0.036  
(0.040) 
0.076   
(0.066) 
-0.002  
(0.065) 
0.002   
(0.088) 
0.001   
(0.088) 
Late in Session 0.108   
(0.069)  
-0.200 
(0.115)*  
0.254   
(0.158)  
0.047   
(0.040)  
-0.010   
(0.093)  
0.074   
(0.090)  
Constant 0.474   
(0.051)***  
0.845   
(0.085)***  
1.464   
(0.115)***  
0.503   
(0.028)***  
0.917   
(0.046)***  
1.589  
(0.062)***  
Date Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 405 405 405 405 405 405 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 
This table reports OLS regression results on the number of questions answered correctly in the cognitive reflection test for the first 
question (Bat), the first two questions (Bat and Widget) and all three questions that were asked to all subjects (Bat, Widget, and Lake).  
The first six regressions analyze subjects who answered the Red Cross donation question and are analyzed in this paper. The second 
six regressions analyze all subjects who answered Cognitive Reflection Test questions in any of the studies listed in SOM 1. Robust 
standard errors are used for all tests and significance is donated: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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SOM5. Instructions shown to Participants 
  
(i) Introduction and Cognitive Load Screen 
  
In this study, you are going to memorize a sequence of letters and answer several 
questions. 
  
People are often busy or distracted while trying to remember things in the real world. We 
are going to have you make a series of judgments and decisions while you try to 
remember a sequence of letters. 
  
Below is a sequence of three letters to memorize and keep in your mind throughout this 
study.  You will be asked to recall this sequence at the end of the study. 
  
  
Letter Sequence: 
[low load condition] G X N  [high load condition] G X N T D P L R W  
  
  
Take a moment to memorize these letters. When you are ready to continue, click the 
“Next'' button. 
  
  
(ii) Request Screen 
  
We have given you an additional $3 for participating in this study. As of now, this money 
is yours and you may use it however you like.  
  
If you’d like, you may choose to donate a portion of your $3 endowment to the American 
Red Cross [return a portion of your $3 endowment to the experimenter for use in future 
studies].  You can donate [return] any amount, including $0.00, in increments of 25 cents. 
  
How much would you like to donate to the American Red Cross [return to the 
experimenter]?  
  
$ _________ 
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SOM6. Original Study 
 
Deliberative Reasoning Constrains Charitable Giving 
 
 
Humans are willing to incur a cost to help others, including genetically unrelated 
strangers, as evidenced by widespread charitable giving (Andreoni, 2006; Gneezy, 
Gneezy, Nelson, & Brown, 2010). A crucial question about the nature of human 
generosity is whether people are innately selfish but capable of generosity or innately 
charitable but capable of selfishness. We investigate this question by considering the role 
of the deliberative system — characterized by careful analytic reasoning — in 
anonymous charitable giving.  
 
Within the dual processes framework of decision making (Kahneman, 2003; Sanfey, 
Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen, 2006; Sloman, 1996), one hypothesis is that people are 
innately selfish (Dawkins, 1989; Moore & Loewenstein, 2004) and the deliberative 
system must determine whether a situation is worthy of personal sacrifice before an 
individual will engage in charitable behavior. An alternative hypothesis is that people are 
inherently altruistic (Bowles, 2006; de Waal, 2008) and the deliberative system must 
inhibit charitable impulses in order to prioritize personal welfare. These two hypotheses 
paint very different pictures of the human generosity and the extent to which we are 
programmed to be generous. 
 
We experimentally test the importance of the deliberative system in the non-strategic 
setting of anonymous charitable giving by occupying cognitive resources crucial to 
deliberative processing with a working memory task (Baddeley, 1992; Gilbert & 
Osborne, 1989; Miller, 1956).1 Charitable giving more than doubles when we impinge 
the deliberative system by placing subjects under high cognitive load. The effect of load 
on giving is specific to charitable donation; cognitive load does not affect giving to a 
general (i.e. non-charitable) request. Our findings suggest that humans are instinctively 
generous and that deliberative reasoning constrains charitable giving. 
 
Method 
This study was a 2 (charity request or general request) x 2 (low or high cognitive load) 
between-subjects design. 
 
Subjects 
Subjects were 205 University of Pennsylvania undergraduates (mean age=20, SD=1.5; 
63% female) who participated in this study as the first of several unrelated studies in an 
hour-long session at the Wharton Behavioral Lab.  Subjects received $10 payment for the 
entire session and whatever they chose to keep in this study. 
 
Charity Request vs. General Request 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Prior research based on disrupting the right dorsolateral prefontal cortex can be interpreted as showing the 
importance of the deliberate system in strategic interactions (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & 
Fehr, 2006). 
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While subjects were under high or low cognitive load, they were given an endowment of 
$3 and exposed to a request. Half of the subjects (n=102) were asked how much they 
wanted to give to the American Red Cross (“Charity Request''). The other half  (n=103) 
were asked how much they wanted to give to the experimenter for use in future studies 
(“General Request''). Subjects could give up to their $3 endowment in increments of 
$0.25. The amount given in response to either request was deducted from the subject’s 
earnings.  
 
The variation in the type of request allows us to determine whether occupying the 
deliberative system affects giving to charitable requests only, or whether it affects giving 
to requests in general (Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). If cognitive load only affects 
charitable giving, we can make inferences about the human charitable instinct; if it affects 
behavior towards both requests, we can only infer the role of the deliberative system in 
compliance more generally. In addition, the general request has the same structure as the 
charitable request, so it acts as a control for other effects cognitive load might have on 
behavior. For example, if high cognitive load makes subjects give randomly or give 
without reading the question carefully, we should observe those behaviors in response to 
both requests.  
 
Cognitive load manipulation 
Cognitive load manipulations often involve asking participants to memorize a sequence 
(Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). 
Since subjects in our experiment were making numeric giving decisions, we asked 
subjects to memorize a sequence of letters — rather than numbers — to avoid anchoring 
effects (Tversky, 1974). Subjects were randomly assigned to memorize either a 3-letter 
sequence (“GXN'') (low cognitive load, n=103), or a 9-letter sequence 
(“GXNTDPLRW'') (high cognitive load n=102). We did not incentivize the cognitive 
load manipulation to avoid income effects.  
 
 
Results 
Figure 1 shows that giving to charity more than doubles when we occupy participants' 
deliberative systems by placing them under high cognitive load (t-test, t=2.986 p=0.004, 
see SOM for robustness tests). Individuals under high cognitive load are not only more 
likely to give nonzero amounts (t=1.993 p=0.049), but they also make larger donations 
conditional on giving (n=49, t=2.289 p=0.027). Furthermore, individuals under high 
cognitive load are significantly more likely to give their entire endowment to charity 
(t=2.663 p=0.009). These results suggest that individuals are inclined to give to charity 
when asked and require cognitive resources to withhold donations. 
 
Importantly, the effect of cognitive load is unique to the charity request. Individuals 
under high cognitive load do not give more to a general request than individuals under 
low cognitive load (t-test, t=0.773 p=0.441); in fact, they give directionally less. 
Occupying the deliberative system does not lead individuals to comply with requests 
more generally; rather, the effect of occupying the deliberative system is specific to 
charitable giving. 
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Discussion 
Occupying the deliberative system with cognitive load increases donation to the 
American Red Cross, a charitable request, but does not affect the amount of money 
returned to the experimenter. That cognitive load does not increase giving back to the 
experimenter demonstrates that the effect of occupying the deliberative system is specific 
to charitable request and that cognitive load is not generating an increase in giving as a 
result of random actions or subjects failing to read the question carefully.  
 
That the average charitable donation more than doubles when subjects are put under high 
cognitive load is consistent with the interpretation that generosity is somewhat automatic 
or instinctual and that cognitive resources are needed for individuals to inhibit charitable 
impulses and act selfishly. The results inform theories about the origin of human 
generosity and has practical implication for charitable fundraising. 
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Fig. 1. Average percentage of the $3 endowment given to either the American Red Cross 
(“Charity Request'') or to the experimenter (“General Request'') (means ± SEM). 
Participants were independently randomized across the Charity Request or General 
Request and across being put under high or low cognitive load. 
 
 
 
 
